Northampton County has appealed Judge Baratta's decision allowing the people to decide whether it may sell its nursing home, notwithstanding an express prohibition in the Home Rule Charter on any matter that extends to the budget. All briefs are in.
My own appeal is much more basic - I've claimed pervasive election fraud in the initiative drive. Claims that County taxpayers funded Eckert Seamans to research this matter for me, are false. That firm was wisely researching the matter to prepare its own challenge in the event that I failed to do so. But I did, and that decision was the result of my own independent research, which convinced me that a fraud was being perpetrated against the public.
Judge Baratta agreed with many of my claims, and in fact invalidated over 2,700 signatures. But it was not enough. Instead of using the 20,063 signatures verified by Voting Registrar Dee Rumsey as his baseline, he used the 23,391 unverified signatures.
Below is the argument I made to the Commonwealth Court.
A) THE COURT BELOW LACKED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS BETWEEN THE VOTING REGISTRAR AND OBJECTORS, AND IGNORED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FROM THE REGISTRAR THAT THERE WAS NO DUPLICATION OF EFFORT.
During her testimony, Voting Registrar Dee Rumsey (incorrectly referred to as Dee Rumsay in the Notes of Testimony), was still in the midst of her count, but made clear that there were 20,063 verified signatures, and no duplication between her efforts and the Objections filed.
Ms. Rumsey: “I’m actually in the process of trying to verify the signatures.”
The Court: “You’re not completed yet?”
Ms. Rumsey: “Correct.”
The Court: “So there could be more, then, unverified signatures?
Ms. Rumsey: “There could, yes. There could be some that are verified as well. I’m finding that there are.”
(N.T., 93-94). In response to questioning from Objector O’Hare, Ms. Rumsey was able to provide a “baseline” of 20,063 verified signatures.
Q. “Can you tell the Court how many signatures you’ve been able to verify?”
A. “At this point the total verification is 19,963.”
Q. “How many names to you have left to search?”
A. “Approximately maybe 100, give or take.”
Q. “So assuming that all 100 of those are good, we’re talking about approximately [20,063 (it is mistakenly transcribed as 20,963)] signatures?”
A. “Correct.”
(N.T., 133).
In addition to providing a baseline of 20,063 signatures, Ms. Rumsey also made clear that her baseline was independent of the complaints made by Objectors, and that there was no overlap between the problems she found and those discovered by Objectors.
Q. “Now there’s been testimony that we’re offering concerning the circulators, concerning Mr. Green, Mr. Rehrig, Ms. Schmoyer, Mr. Dalessandro, Mr Creamer, Ms. Wise [sic, should be Weiss], and Mr. Paisley, are you including those objections that we’re making in court, or are you leaving that for the court?”
A. “We’re leaving that for the Court. We’re only making sure they are registered voters.”
(N.T., 132-133).
The Court questioned Ms. Rumsey about possible duplication as well.
The Court [incorrectly referred to as Ms. Rumsay in the Notes of Testimony]: “Now you haven’t challenged, I take it, the signatures individually challenged by each circulator that Mr. O’Hare is challenging, is that correct?”
Ms. Rumsey: “No.”
The Court: “Okay. Good enough, just so I understand, all right.”
(N.T., 139).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court did appear to be satisfied with Objector O’Hare’s explanation that the signatures invalidated by the Registrar were independent of the complaints being made by O’Hare.
Mr. O’Hare: “Your Honor, with that, we would rest. We would ask the court to discount the signatures, 19,963 signatures that have been verified, we’re about a hundred to go by the elections office. We would ask the Court to discount the signatures of Gerry Green, obtained by Gerry Green, and Tim Rehrig, which amount to 300 signatures.”
The Court: “But, Mr. O’Hare, wouldn’t I assume that they’ve been discounted by the registrar?”
Mr. O’Hare: “No, because she testified she did not.”
The Court: “Did she verify all the signatures including the circulators?”
Mr. O’Hare: “Correct. She verified those signatures. I’m asking this Court on the basis of the testimony –“
The Court: “Why would she count the signatures when she could not verify the circulator?”
Mr. O’Hare: “She indicated she did. She indicated that she verified the signatures of Gerry – that were obtained by Gerry Green, and she indicated that she considered those signatures valid. The question of a circulator for the residency of a circulator, she thought that was a matter for this court.”
The Court: “All right.”
(N.T., 158-159).
Unfortunately, in its February 9 Opinion, the Court below posited that Objectors had some duty to collate the invalid signatures determined by the Registrar with the invalid signatures improperly obtained by circulators. This conclusion is completely contrary to the record established. As previously explained, the Registrar left those signatures for the Court to decide, but the Court nevertheless concluded there must be duplication. “To what extent there is duplication, one will never know.” (Appendix, page 16).
Unrefuted evidence indicates there was no duplication at all. Instead of deducting the 2,722 signatures the Court determined invalid from the 23,391 total signatures submitted, the Court below should have deducted those 2,722 signatures from the 20,063 signature baseline established by the Registrar or the 20,992 baseline that the Court itself established (Appendix, page 13). In either case (20,063 -2,722 = 17,341 or 20,992 – 2,722 = 18,270), the final number is below the 10 per cent threshold of 19,631.
At no time during the February 4 hearing was Ms. Rumsey’s testimony impeached in any way. There is no “substantial evidence” from which the Court below could conclude that that there was any duplication at all. In re Rankin, 583 Pa. 38, 874 A.2d 1145 (2005) (findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence); In re DiGirolamo, 873 A.2d 52 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (substantial evidence requirement).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Procyson v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 4 A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). In this case, the only evidence produced at all was that there was no duplication and hence no need to collate.
The effect of the Court’s ruling is to reward 1,166 unregistered voters and 1,173 people who signed the Petition more than once. It winks at two circulators who, by their own testimony, filed 38 false affidavits. It is nothing short of an abdication of judicial review.
Admittedly, setting aside an initiative petition signed by thousands of registered Northampton County voters, is unpopular. In its Opinion , the Court below acknowledges that a sale of the County-owned nursing home will obviously impact the 700 County employees who work there. But the Court below has no authority to make a finding of fact that is not supported by substantial evidence simply because the result might make it unpopular in some circles.
The Court’s unwillingness to accept this unrefuted evidence is probably the result of an attempt to reach a prompt decision in an election case. Indeed, even this Court has fast-tracked this matter. But why? This Court has previously remarked that “[t]ime is of the essence in election matters as challenges must be resolved within a limited time period given the election year calendar.” In re Nomination Paper of Rogers, 942 A.2d 915, 926 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). But this is an Initiative election, in which the election year calendar is irrelevant. It makes no difference whether the matter is placed on the ballot in May or in November, if it ever makes it on the ballot at all.
The Court’s determination that Objectors have some affirmative obligation to collate its invalid signatures with those determined by the Register of Voters, ignores the harsh reality that the Registrar was still reviewing those signatures at the time of the February 4 hearing, with approximately 100 signatures to go. Objectors had no right as citizens or even as litigants to disrupt her count and make her stop and ensure she was collating her invalid signatures with the ones being challenged. That directive could only come from the Court below.
In a pre-hearing memorandum, Objector requested that the parties be directed to meet for the purpose of simplifying issues, which is the norm in this Court for election challenges involving large number of signatures. At the hearing, Objector O’Hare again suggested a conference for the purpose of simplifying issues. (N.T., 4) But this Court insisted on moving full speed ahead, without regard to the uncertainties that would inevitably arise. This is contrary to the practice in this Court, when large numbers of signatures are involved.
In In re Nomination Paper of Nader, 588 Pa.450, 457, 905 A.2d 450, 454 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 995 (2007), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court complimented the Commonwealth Court for its “Herculean effort,” in which twelve judges worked nights and weekends with a line-by-line review of signatures. Similarly, in In re Nomination Paper of Rogers, 942 A.2d 915 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), then President Judge Colins mobilized court resources and made nine computer terminals available to the litigants. Though this case is by no means as big as Nader or Rogers, it still involves 23,391 unverified signatures.
In his Opinion below, Judge Baratta feels compelled “to note that the Objectors, who appeared pro se, were given every opportunity to create their record.” (Appendix, page 13). But it is Judge Baratta who ignored a request for a conference and who proceeded full speed ahead with a Registrar who was still in the middle of her count. Had Judge Baratta been aware of the typical practice in this Court, it is very likely there would have been no confusion over collation and it is certain that the result would have been much different, and your Objector would be the Appellee instead of Appellant.
B) THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ALLOWING 1,439 SIGNATURES FROM A CIRCULATOR WHO WOULD PASS OUT AS MANY AS 15 PETITIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY AT FIRE HALLS AND BINGO PARLORS AND WAS THEREFORE UNABLE TO MAKE THE 5-POINT DETERMINATION REQUIRED BY THE ELECTION CODE, 25 P.S. § 2869.
Mary Ann Schmoyer is a member of the Gracedale Petition Committee who circulated 48 of the 507 total petitions circulated. (N.T., 84). In the course of reviewing these Petitions, it became apparent to Objectors that she was circulating as many as fifteen petitions at one time.
In her own words at the February 4 hearing, “I was operating with maybe sometimes 10 petitions at a time. I went to various fire halls, bingos, breakfasts, and there may be 10 tables.” (N.T., 84). Ms. Schmoyer later indicated there might be 15 tables, “depending on how big the hall was at the time wherever I was at.” (N.T., 85).
Q. “So what you’re trying to convince this Court of is that you could have 15 petitions at 15 different tables at one time and that somehow you were able to witness each person signing each of those instruments, is that correct?”
Mr. Otter: “Objection, he’s badgering the witness. The question has been asked and answered.”
The Court: “Do you understand the question, ma’am?”
Ms. Schmoyer: “Yes.”
The Court: “Can you answer it?”
Ms. Schmoyer: “I did walk up and down. I did watch as carefully as I could to each one sign the petition.”
(N.T., 86-87).
In In re Nomination of Flaherty, 564 Pa. 671, 770 A.2d 327 (2001), the Supreme Court noted with dismay that courts were becoming too lax with the Election Code requirement that circulators must make a 5-point determination about each signatory to an election petition. Id. At 687, 770 A.2d at 336.
“The language in Section 909 [25 P.S. § 2869], therefore, unambiguously requires that the circulator affirming the petition be aware of five criteria about each individual signer: (1) the signer signed the petition with full knowledge of its contents; (2) the signer’s address is correct; (3) the signer resides in the county in the affidavit; (4) the signer signed the petition on the date set forth; and (5) to the best of the circulator’s knowledge and belief, the signer was a qualified elector and a member of the party claimed on the petition. In order to know this information, it seems clear that the circulator needs to be present when each signer agrees to sign the petition.”
Id. at 686, 770 A.2d at 336. (Emphasis added).
Later in its opinion, sensing a need to stress that a circulator be physically present for each signature, the Flaherty Court states,
“Although Section 909 [25 P.S. § 2869] does not explicitly state that the circulator must be present at the time signatures are obtained, the circulator clearly must be present when an elector signs the petition in order to truly be aware of the criteria listed in Section 909. Accordingly, based on the criteria listed in Section 909, which a circulator must know in order to affirm the petition, we believe that the General Assembly intended that the circulator affirming the petition be present when each person signs his name to that petition. From this point hence, therefore, signatures shall be removed from a petition if the circulator who has affirmed the petition was not in the presence of the elector as the elector signed the petition.”
Id. at 687, 770 A.2d at 336-337 (Emphasis added).
Obviously, there is no way that Ms. Schmoyer could make this 5-point determination because she was not physically present as each person signed the petition. In a large hall, she could have been at one end of the room while others at another end of the room were signing petitions. Unless she had eyes in the back of her head, there is simply no way she could have been present as each person signed.
In its Opinion, the Court below veers away from the ruling in Flaherty, and gives election petitions the same importance as bingo cards. “Clearly, the circulators are not required to lord over each signatory, watching as each signatory fills out each section of the signature line.” (Appendix, page 14). But that’s precisely what Flaherty requires. There simply is no other way that a circulator like Ms. Schmoyer can determine that a person signed a petition with full knowledge of its contents unless she watched him do it. She can only determine that a signer’s address is accurate, or that he lives in the County and is a registered voter, by confirming that with him. She can only determine that the signer signed on the date provided in the petition, by watching him do it.
Judge Baratta’s decision winks at a disturbing and increasingly prevalent practice, in which nomination petitions languish alone in bars or stores and some bartender or cook can later claim he was mixing cocktails or flipping burgers while simultaneously ascertaining the five criteria demanded by the Election Code. Instead of preserving the integrity of the election process, this turns it into a sham.
Had the Court below stricken the 1,439 signatures improperly obtained by Circulator Mary Ann Schmoyer, this ballot initiative fails under all scenarios, even if Judge Baratta insists on using the 23,390 unverified signatures as a baseline. Since the Court below had already found that 2,722 signatures were bad, invalidating the 1,439 signatures obtained by Ms. Schmoyer would have ended the initiative drive because the total number falls below the 10% threshold of 19,631. (23,390 minus 2,722 minus 1,439 = 19,229).
C) THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ACCEPTING ANY OF THE SIGNATURES FROM TWO CIRCULATORS WHO, BY THEIR OWN TESTIMONY, ADMITTED TO FILING 38 FALSE AFFIDAVITS WITH INITIATIVE PETITIONS.
Two Gracedale employees, one of them its AFSCME union president, acted as circulators. In reviewing their petitions, Objectors learned that circulator Ellen Weiss (AFSCME union president at Gracedale and VP of the Lehigh Valley Labor Council) obtained 2,269 of the 23,391 unverified signatures. On Election Day alone (11/2/10), she obtained 1,229 signatures, and in municipalities as far apart as Hellertown and Pen Argyl. Assuming that she spent just one hour that day in driving and for necessities, she would have to have obtained one signature every 35 seconds, a physical impossibility. (Objections to Gracedale Initiative Petition, Objection 1).
Another Gracedale employee, Dana Paisley, acted as a circulator, too, and he obtained 1,188 of the 23,391 unverified signatures. On Election Day alone (11/2/10), he obtained 537 signatures, in places as far apart as Wilson Borough and Walnutport, or 41 per hour between 7 AM and 8 PM. (Objections to Gracedale Initiative Petition, Objection 2).
After being served with subpoenas, both Weiss and Paisley retained prominent Easton attorney Gary Asteak, Esq., who entered his appearance on their behalf and attempted unsuccessfully to have their subpoenas quashed. (N.T., 51-52).
When they finally took the stand, both Weiss and Paisley were forced to admit that they had filed thirty-eight false affidavits claiming to have circulated petitions that were, in fact, circulated by unidentified persons.
Weiss attempted to explain.
Q. “And can you tell the court, are you the named circulator to those? We’re talking about a number of circulated petitions. Are you the named circulator?”
A. “I am the named.”
Q. “Are you the actual circulator?
A. “Not of all of them.”
Q. “Could you tell the Court how that happened?”
A. “Well, people came to me with the petitions. I was never given any real direction on them, they came to me. They piled up at work and I took them down and had them signed.”
Q. “So you did not personally circulate all the petitions we’re talking about?”
A. “No.”
(N.T., 144-145). Later, she explains the 38 false affidavits that she and Mr. Paisley filed.
Q. “You signed an affidavit on the ones you did not circulate indicating that you had?”
A. “I didn’t know it wasn’t correct.”
Q. “An affidavit?”
A. “I didn’t know it wasn’t correctly done. Direction wasn’t given to me stating that the –“
Q. “Let me see here. ‘He or she is a qualified elector duly registered and enrolled as a member of a political party. The signers in the foregoing petition signed the sakme with full knowledge of the contents that the representative residents are correctly stated therein, that they all reside in the said political district and that each signed on the date of said opposite to his or her name and then to the best of the deponent’s knowledge and belief?’”
A. “The signers are qualified, registered and enrolled electors of the designated party, correct?”
Q. “With respect to signatures you did not circulate?”
A. “I was under the assumption of – I can’t think of the word, circulator was just circulating the petition, I did not do it in any –“
(N.T., 148-149).
In his Decision, Judge Baratta did strike 2,304 signatures offered by circulators Weiss and Paisley, which represented the signatures in the petitions they did not personally circulate. (Appendix, page 15). But he admitted the 757 (693 plus 64) signatures that Weiss claimed to have obtained personally, as well as 396 signatures supposedly obtained by Paisley. (Appendix, pages 9-10). In effect, he rewarded two circulators who had just admitted filing a combined 38 false affidavits. Neither identified who, if anyone, circulated those petitions. Their fraudulent activity contaminated all the petitions they circulated. To preserve the integrity of the election process, this Court had no choice but to strike every signature obtained by Weiss (2,269) and Paisley (1,229).
In allowing these signatures, the Court below relies on In re Nomination of Flaherty, 564 Pa. 671, 770 A.2d 327 (2001), stating that “those signatures which have been validly obtained must be counted.” (Appendix, page 15). But the Flaherty Court dealt with a candidate who was acting in good faith and following existing case law. In contrast, these circulators acted ten years after Flaherty as decided, and filed an incredible 38 false affidavits taking credit for petitions that were circulated by persons unknown. They retained one of Northampton County’s best criminal defense lawyers, Gary Asteak, Esq., and attempted to quash the subpoenas. Having failed there, they could tell the truth or commit perjury. It is commendable that Ms. Weiss and Mr. Paisley admitted their error, but an error of this magnitude tainted everything they touched.
Instead of Flaherty, this case is closer to In re Cianfrini, 467 Pa. 491, 359 A.2d 383 (1976), in which a candidate for a Democratic party office filed an affidavit claiming that he was a registered Democrat, but did not actually enroll until the following day. This candidate’s petition was invalidated. Even “assuming the absence of any wrongful intent, the fact remains that when the affidavit was taken the facts sworn to were not true.” Id. at 494, 359 A.2d at 384. “The requirements of sworn affidavits are to insure the legitimacy of information crucial to the election process. Thus, the policy of the liberal reading of the Election Code cannot be distorted to emasculate those requirements necessary to assure the probity of the process.” Id. Cianfrini involves just one false affidavit.
Cianfrini was followed in In re Barlip, 59 Pa. Cmwlth. 178, 428 A.2d 1058 (1981), in which a Lehigh County Commissioner candidate filed a false affidavit with his nomination petition, claiming he had filled out and submitted his ethics statement. This defect was considered “fatal” to the nominating petition.
In State Ethics Comm’n v. Baldwin, 498 Pa. 225, 445 A.2d 1208 (1982), the Supreme Court explains that “the Cianfrani ruling was required to deter deliberate attempts to frustrate the election process … .” Id. at --, 445 A.2d at 1211. It is respectfully submitted that 38 false affidavits constitute a “deliberate” attempt to impede the election process, and justifies a demand that all affidavits submitted by the guilty parties be rejected. As Justice Musmanno so eloquently stated, “[F]raud of itself poisons the stream of the will of the electorate.” In re City Treasurer, 400 Pa. 507, 518,162 A.2d 363, 368 (1960) (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Musmanno).
D) THE COURT BELOW FAILED TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE ELECTION PROCESS BY ALLOWING AN INITIATIVE TO PROCEED NOTWITHSTANDING PERVASIVE FRAUD, IN WHICH
• TEN PERCENT OF THE SIGNATURES ARE THE RESULT OF UNREGISTERED VOTERS AND DUPLICATE SIGNATORIES;
• FIVE CIRCULATORS MAY HAVE SIGNED THE INITIATIVE PETITION MORE THAN ONCE.
• TWO CIRCULATORS FILED 38 FALSE AFFIDAVITS TAKING CREDIT FOR PETITIONS THEY NEVER CIRCULATED;
• ONE CIRCULATOR DISTRIBUTED AS MANY AS FIFTEEN PETITIONS AT ONE TIME; AND
• NONRESIDENT UNION EMPLOYEES SERVED AS CIRCULATORS.
In a “legal standard” that consumes two pages of its Decision (Appendix, pages 11-12), the Court below correctly observes that petitions and signatures are presumptively valid and doubts must be resolved in their favor. But it completely forgets that "states have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process.” In re Nomination Papers of Carlson, 60 Pa. Commw. 170, 430 A.2d 1210 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), aff'd, 494 Pa. 139, 430 A.2d 1155 (1981), and that the Courts have an obligation and take whatever action is needed to prevent fraud. In re Nomination Petition of Shimkus, 946 A.2d 139 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). As a result, the Court ignored undisputed testimony exposing not mere technicalities, but fatal flaws displaying a complete contempt for the Election Code by the Petition Committee.
In the Court’s own review of Voting Registrar Dee Rumsey’s testimony (Appendix, pages 6-7), he acknowledges that 1,166 signatures come from persons who are not even registered voters. Another 1,173 are from people who signed this petition more than once. This is pervasive election fraud, an infection that extends to ten per cent of the 23,391 unverified signatures. At the best, this displays a callous disregard for the integrity of the election process.
What’s even more disturbing is that five Gracedale circulators signed the Petition more than once. Review of Exhibit 1, which consists of all 507 petitions, reveals the following:
* Circulator Donna Dzojko-Mraz signed the Petition at least twice. (See Exhibit 1, Petition 176, line 8 & Petition 293, line 29.)
* Circulator Wendy M. Haggerty signed the Petition at least twice. (See Exhibit 1, Petition 289, line 10 and Petition 271, line 36.)
* Circulator James Russell Irwin signed the Petition at least twice. (See Exhibit 1, Petition 224, line 25 and Petition 320, line 2.)
* Circulator Loretta Ann Mammana, who is also a member of the Gracedale Initiative Committee, signed the Petition at least twice. (See Exhibit 1, Petition 72, line 1 and Petition 166, line 11.)
* Circulator Mary Ann Warmkessel signed the Petition at least twice. (See Exhibit 1, Petition 303, line 11 and Petition 304, line 22.)
To be fair to both the Court below and this Court, it must be noted that this duplication by circulators themselves was unknown by anyone except the guilty parties themselves on February 4, when Judge Baratta took testimony. It was admitted into evidence as part of Exhibit A, but neither the parties nor the Court below were aware of this fraud. Objector O’Hare has filed an Affidavit explaining that he only became aware of this information himself on March 1, 2011, in response to a Right-to-Know Law request. The information was immediately furnished to Lawrence M. Otter, Esq., who represents the Gracedale Initiative Committee.
This Court might wish to reject this after-acquired evidence concerning five Circulators, which was never made available to Judge Baratta. On the other hand, evidence suggesting further chicanery by Gracedale circulators might be a basis for asking Judge Baratta to take a second look.
It should be no surprise that circulators who appear to have signed the Petition more than once would be reticent to volunteer that kind of information. Fraud of this kind has always been recognized as the “wolf at the door,” and this “concealment is itself indicative of fraud.” In re City Treasurer, 400 Pa. 507, 519-520,162 A.2d 363, 369 (1960) (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Musmanno).
Judge Baratta had an understandable desire to decide an election case quickly. But he failed to issue a case management order that is the norm for this Court when large numbers of signatories are involved. Had that been done, and a line-by-line review undertaken, this deception would have been discovered and the learned Court below might have reached a different conclusion.
What the Court below did learn during the February 4 hearing is that two Circulators, AFSCME union president Ellen Weiss and Gracedale employee Dana Paisley, engaged in massive election fraud, submitting 38 false affidavits taking credit for circulating petitions that were actually circulated by others or may just have languished in bars and social clubs. (See Appendix, pages 9 – 10). According to AFSCME union president Ellen Weiss, “[P]eople came to me with the petitions. I was never given any real direction on them, they came to me. They piled up at work and I took them down and had them signed.” (N.T., 145). Weiss explained, “I was under the assumption of - - I can’t think of the word, circulator was just circulating the petition.” (N.T., 149)
Two of the circulators were nonresident union officials (Appendix, page 7) and one circulator was not herself a registered voter. (Id., page 8).
All of these circumstances reveal pervasive election fraud. Although the invalidity of some signatures is not by itself a basis for invalidating an entire petition, In re Payton, 596 Pa. 469, 945 A.2d 162 (2008), at least three members of the Supreme Court’s bench believe that the Election Code exists to provide a remedy for precisely what we see here. “I understand the concern with containing the growing proliferation of election challenges. I believe, however, that the legislature’s intent to curtail election fraud is also manifest in the Election Code, so that there are strong and important countervailing policies in tension in cases such as these.” Id., at 471, 945 A.2d at 163 (Concurring Opinion of Justice Saylor, joined by Justices Todd and McCaffrey).
In the Court below, Judge Baratta was so concerned about protecting the admittedly important right to vote, In re James, 596 Pa. 442, 944 A.2d 69 (2008), that he approved an initiative that makes that right a mockery.
This carelessness and disregard for the Election Code actually defeats the right to vote. Justice Saylor believes pervasive fraud should be examined, and so does the ruling in In re Tumolo Nomination, 48 Pa. D. & C. 2d 134 (Phila. C. P. 1969), in which a Philadelphia City Council candidate and his petition circulators were extremely careless and negligent in preparing petitions and obtaining signatures.
"The right of an individual to offer himself as a candidate for public office is one of the most fundamental attributes of citizenship under our form of government and such a privilege will not be lightly denied. We agree, therefore, that the law in this area should be construed liberally to allow qualified potential candidates to run for election. However, the legislature has enacted certain rules, embodied in the Pennsylvania Election Code, which circumscribe the proper exercise of this privilege and seek to protect this sacred right from abuse. We strongly feel that an individual, such as respondent herein, who fails to demonstrate any real desire to comply with these rules, has abused the privilege of running for public office and, therefore, should be denied the right to do so."
Id. at 139.
As with the Tumolo Court, it is clear that the Gracedale Inititative Committee’s pervasive fraud has exposed the sacred right to vote to abuse. The Initiative Committee has demonstrated a complete inability to abide by the rules.
